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This article situates the international activities of subnational governments in India within the
broader political economy of federalism. It argues that the nature and the extent of subnational
states’engagements in international affairs are a function of the partisan political relationship the
state incumbents have with the national incumbents.The article takes a mixedmethods approach.
An analysis of 1,153 episodes of international engagements of India’s states from 1996 to 2017
reveals that shifts in foreign policy engagement of selected state governments primarily reflect
alterations in the subnational incumbents’ political affiliation with the Union government. Several
qualitative case studies shed light on how the central government’s inclusion of subnational
governments’perspectives and representatives in foreign affairs is highly partisan and profoundly
political. Therefore, the Indian case reveals how subnational diplomatic interactions merge
domestic and international politics.
Since the 1980s, subnational governments (SNGs) across the globe have intensified
their international engagements. Yet, within single nation states, the intensity of
SNGs’ international engagements—termed paradiplomacy—varies considerably. In
the United States, for instance, California with its two internationally active
cities—San Francisco and Los Angeles—is an explicit case of paradiplomacy going
its own way (Poulos 2017). In Brazil, S~ao Paulo state stands out in terms of both
the institutionalization of its paradiplomacy and sheer activism. In Russia, the
North-Western regions are known to exhibit much greater international activity
(Kaliningrad being the most vigorous actor of international cooperation) than the
North Caucasian or the Far Eastern regions. Guangdong Province in China tends
to exercise relatively high levels of foreign policy activism. Similarly, Flanders
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region in Belgium and Quebec in Canada have been most active in international
engagements. In the literature, there is a consensus that the conjunction of
liberalization and democratization, with globalization as a facilitator, has enhanced
the opportunities for subnational governments’ international engagements
(Aldecoa and Keating 1999; Michelmann and Soldatos 1990; Plagemann and
Destradi 2015; Schiavon 2018), and a number of comparative empirical studies on
western states exist (Duchacek 1984; Hocking 1986; Requejo 2011). Yet, there is
much less evidence of the determinants of regional variations in international
engagement within a particular country case, especially in countries from the global
south. This article aims to fill this void using India as a case study.
India has a democratic, formally federal constitution, according to which state
governments are popularly elected, but are not assigned any authority in foreign
affairs. As Bhaumik (2016) points out, the central government is supposed to take
into account states’ interests in its foreign policy, especially vis-a-vis neighbouring
countries, while state governments are supposed to keep in mind the “national
interest”. Although there is neither a constitutional provision on states’
international engagements nor any institutional mechanism to resolve center–
state differences on foreign policy issues, Indian states have become increasingly
active international players. This has happened as a consequence of the
liberalization reforms beginning in 1991 (Kennedy 2013) as well as of the growing
importance of state-level politics after the formation of regionalized coalition
governments at the center since 1996 (Yadav and Palshikar 2008). SNGs engage in
the international arena to attract foreign direct investment, forge links with foreign
national and subnational governments, and modulate or even challenge the central
government’s foreign policy stances (Dossani and Vijaykumar 2005; Jacob 2016;
Jain and Maini 2017; Sridharan 2003). Since 2014, a States Division in India’s
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) serves as an acknowledgement of such greater
activism on the part of the central government. Yet, as Jenkins (2003, 73)
highlights, India’s central government still effectively “curtails the diplomatic
autonomy of state governments.” Hence, the role of Indian states in economic
diplomacy or their potential for independent international action should not be
overstated.
This is where our contribution sets in. Overall, Indian SNGs’ international
engagements have not taken place in an even manner. How can we explain
differences in the degree of international engagement of SNGs? After discussing the
state of the art, we develop a framework to explain sub-state diplomatic
interactions. We use conceptual tools from theories of federalism (Elazar 1987;
Hooghe et al. 2016; Watts 2000) and institutional analysis (North 1991; Tsebelis
2000). Moreover, we draw on comparative empirical studies on paradiplomacy
(Duchacek 1984; Hocking 1986; Kaiser 2005; Michelmann and Soldatos 1990;
Paquin and LaChappelle 2005; Requejo 2011). Our main theoretical focus is on the
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partisan relationships and the power struggles between central and state
governments over international issues.
In our empirical analysis, we adopt a mixed methods approach. After presenting
our data regarding Indian states’ foreign engagements, we undertake a cross-
sectional and longitudinal analyses to shed light on the determinants of Indian
states’ foreign relations and explain spatial as well as temporal variation. Temporal
variations can be studied against the backdrop of vacillating relationships between
the center and the states over time. Our analysis focuses on the years 1996–2017.
After a phase of extreme centralization, in the 1990s the liberalization of the
economy and the pluralization of the Indian party system contributed to a de facto
diffusion of political power, leading to a more decentralized form of federalism.
After 2014 however, the balance of power has shifted once more toward the center
under the first BJP-led government (2014–2019), which did not depend on
regional coalition partners.1 Yet, different subnational units have continued to
assert their role in foreign affairs, even though their scope of international action
has not expanded to the extent expected after the ascent of Prime Minister Modi—
a former Chief Minister of the state of Gujarat, who despite his party’s comfortable
majority in the lower house of parliament, repeatedly declared that India’s states
had an important role to play in foreign affairs (Jacob 2016, 3). As evident from
the description of states’ international engagements documented in the Online
Appendix, the initial rise in state governments’ international action was not
maintained beyond 2015.
We argue that in India, the extent and nature of international engagement of a
particular SNG is contingent upon its economic status, on the one hand, and its
political relation with the ruling party at the center, on the other. Hence, in our
empirical analysis, we study how regional variations in international engagements
during a particular period are influenced by these two variables—the huge regional
economic disparities and the tendency of the central governments in Indian
politics to deal with states based on their political leanings or affiliation of the
Chief Ministers (Sharma 2017b). The quantitative analysis is followed by a
qualitative discussion of selected cases, which enables us to identify some of the
processes and mechanisms leading to variation in SNGs’ international engage-
ments. This qualitative analysis helps us to further theorize the nexus between
partisan federalism and SNGs’ international engagements.
We find that shifts in state governments’ foreign engagements primarily reflect
alterations in their political affiliation with the Union government. Not
surprisingly, regional parties were in a better position to influence national policy
making during the coalition era in Indian politics (1996–2013) than during the
time periods in which one party could potentially govern without alliance partners.
The central government’s inclusion of subnational governments in foreign affairs is
also highly partisan and profoundly political. In sum, the Indian case shows that
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subnational diplomatic interactions merge domestic and international politics, with
domestic rationales typically prevailing over international ones.
Subnational Foreign Policy Activism: State of the Art
The literature on paradiplomacy primarily addresses the causes of the phenom-
enon. It identifies two sets of drivers of paradiplomacy, one external and the other
internal: First, globalization has brought about the very opportunities for sub-state
diplomacy to flourish. International competition over foreign direct investments
(FDI) but also the facilitation of transnational interactions and a growth in
diaspora contacts have created a set of incentives for subnational executives to
engage in diplomatic activities. Additionally, the development of regional
multilateral institutions, in Europe in particular, has provided for institutional
mechanisms and, more generally, for a favourable political context for
paradiplomacy (Cornago 2018, 1458). Second and domestically, economic
liberalization, often combined with democratization and decentralization reforms
throughout the 1990s and beyond, provided the autonomy needed for
paradiplomacy to thrive (Schiavon 2018; Sridharan 2003). According to some,
the resurgence of identity politics as a response to globalization’s homogenizing
tendencies encouraged subnational political entities to cultivate their respective
regional specificities, including through paradiplomatic activities like cultural
exchange with ethnic kin regions or nation states abroad (see Plagemann and
Destradi 2015, 730).
However, the literature is much less clear about the causes for variation of
federal units’ foreign engagements within individual nation-states. This is so
despite the fact that virtually all federations exhibit a considerable degree of
variation in terms of their constituents’ paradiplomatic scope, motives, and
effectiveness. Given the heterogeneity of subnational states within large federations,
variation in paradiplomatic activities should not be surprising. For one, the
literature on subnational diplomacy tends to underline economic motives (Aldecoa
and Keating 1999, vi). Subnational states with a strong manufacturing base, history
of foreign trade relations, or vibrant business communities are more likely to
engage in economic diplomacy than less economically developed states—typically,
they also possess stronger administrative capacities, a key precondition (Antholis
2013). For instance, Conlan et al. (2004) found that the considerable variation in
U.S. state assemblies’ international legislative activity was explained primarily by
the degree of state involvement in the international economy. In the rich world,
these are also states that may engage in development cooperation. Conversely,
subnational states with a history as development aid recipients may engage in
paradiplomacy in order to attract foreign aid (Salomon 2012, 275). Moreover,
subnational governments of states with strong diaspora communities, which
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provide for essential remittances in some cases, may have both political and
economic incentives to lobby the center in matters regarding bilateral relations
with diaspora host countries as well as to directly cultivate relations with them
(Schiavon 2018, 199–200; Totoricagüena 2005).
Likewise, subnational states with international borders will have more reasons
and opportunities to engage with foreign neighbours as compared to landlocked
subnational units (McMillan 2008, 244). And subnational states with close ethnic,
language, or cultural ties to foreign countries or regions can be expected to be
more internationally active than others. According to Cantir, this is particularly
pronounced with those subnational governments dissatisfied with the center’s
“offer for the region’s powers and tools for identity projection” (Cantir 2020, 2;
also see Aldecoa and Keating 1999). In fact, irrespective of transnational kin
relationships, subnational entities with aspirations for greater autonomy may find
paradiplomacy an attractive “expression of an identity distinct from the one
projected by the central state” (Lecours 2008, 3). For instance, in South Africa—
where the dominant African National Congress has used its authority over foreign
affairs to thwart provincial governments’ international engagement—the province
of Western Cape, controlled by the opposition Democratic Alliance since 2009, has
implemented several innovations in the management of sub-state diplomacy,
effectively circumventing the institutional constraints to paradiplomacy (Nganje
2014). Finally, some studies suggest that the individual character of subnational
leaders, their personal interests in foreign affairs, and their national aspirations
were the most important predictors of foreign policy activism (McMillan 2008,
244; Kincaid 1990). Vivid examples include Bavaria’s Franz Josef Strauß and,
indeed, PM Modi’s tenures as Chief Minister in Gujarat from October 2001 to May
2014 (Wyatt 2017, 118).
Considering the scattered literature on the causes for variation within
federations, the case of India supports several of the expectations regarding the
motives for paradiplomatic engagements above. As we will later discuss in greater
detail, economically developed states with a history of foreign trade, such as
Gujarat or Maharashtra, are the most visible in economic diplomacy. At the same
time, the border states of Punjab, West Bengal, and Tamil Nadu, have each in its
own way put an imprint on India’s bilateral relations with Pakistan, Bangladesh,
and Sri Lanka, respectively (Plagemann and Destradi 2015). Kerala, in turn, with
its large diaspora community in the Middle East, has exhibited a keen interest in
New Delhi’s relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Yet, there is also
contradictory evidence. Although a large and economically relatively developed
state, West Bengal’s interest in paradiplomacy beyond a few core issues related to
Indo-Bangladeshi relations has been miniscule. Likewise, Tamil Nadu’s Chief
Minister J. Jayalalithaa was, according to one analysis, diplomatically “reactive”
(Wyatt 2017, 118). And the Northeastern states, despite both being potential
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beneficiaries of closer economic relations to neighboring Bangladesh, Myanmar,
and even China, and despite their cultural affinity to Southeast Asia (and distance
from India’s mainland), have not yet emerged as paradiplomatic actors.
One possible way to make sense of such contradictions, as well as of the ebb
and flow of activities over time outlined in more detail below, is to focus on the
political relations between state governments and the central government. In
countries like India, where subnational, state-based parties assert themselves
nationally by entering into coalition governments at the center, partisan politics
play a crucial role in shaping their international engagement.2 Here, those state-
based parties with a prospect for national power may be induced to develop some
foreign policy competency (Sridharan 2003, 468–470), with potential repercussions
for their home state’s foreign engagements. And once part of a national coalition,
new opportunities arise, as for instance in channelling FDI or aid towards the
home state (Jenkins 2003, 71–72).
It is therefore helpful to connect the literature on subnational diplomacy with
the one on partisanship and foreign policy. In the realist tradition of International
Relations, foreign policy has been considered a domain in which partisan positions
and party ideologies hardly matter: “politics stop at the water’s edge” and partisan
differences tend to be overcome in the name of an objectively given “national
interest.” Yet, liberal approaches and the Foreign Policy Analysis literature
highlight that states are not “black boxes” and that domestic actors play a crucial
role in defining what constitutes the national interest. Political parties are key
actors in this regard (Rathbun 2004; Calin 2010). In parliamentary systems,
political parties have even greater opportunities to translate their positions into
foreign policies (Rathbun 2004, 3). Generally speaking, leftist parties tend to
pursue a more inclusive foreign policy, to be sceptical of military interventions,
and to be open to multilateralism (ibid.: 2–3). In contrast, democratic countries
governed by right-of-center parties are more likely to initiate military conflicts than
those with left-of-center parties in government (for an overview see Calin 2010,
56–62).3 At the same time, the literature on party ideologies also includes evidence
suggesting a more fluid and less conclusive impact of party ideologies on foreign
policy (e.g., Cronin and Fordham 1999). For example, changes in parties’ voter
bases or in access to executive power (Lewis 2017) can reshape political parties’
foreign policy positions over time.
Another strand in the Foreign Policy Analysis literature assesses the impact of
coalition settings (single party versus coalition governments) on foreign policy. Yet,
findings are inconclusive, and it remains unclear whether coalition governments
will be more restrained as well as constrained in their engagement due to their
inherent checks and balances (e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993, 626), or more
aggressive because the parties involved become less accountable when they form
part of a coalition (e.g., Prins and Sprecher 2016) or because of the
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disproportionate influence of small coalition partners. More recent research points
out that coalition governments are not inherently more aggressive or peaceful, but
that they do engage in more “extreme” foreign policy behavior (Kaarbo and
Beasley 2008). Yet, how partisan politics and the setup of governing coalitions play
out when it comes to explaining subnational governments’ foreign engagements has
been largely ignored, both in the literature on paradiplomacy and federalism as
well as in the literature on Foreign Policy Analysis.
Center^State Partisan Political Relationships and their Impact on
Subnational Governments’ International Engagements
The national government and subnational actors (states) can interact in shaping a
country’s foreign policy in several ways. At one extreme, full control of the central
government corresponds with a classic understanding of foreign policy as “high
politics” including the core tasks of defending national security, state sovereignty,
and of pursuing the “national interest” (Shaw 2017). In most federations, the
conduct of foreign affairs, including treaty-making power, is an unfettered function
of the national government. In such systems, there is the problem of how “the
power of the general [sic] government in foreign affairs, whatever its extent may
be, is to be so controlled that in its exercise the divergent interests of the
component regions in the federation shall be duly safeguarded” (Wheare 1970,
183).
At the other extreme of the continuum, we have a fully independent foreign
policy making on the part of subnational states, an ideal-type to be found in
practice only when it comes to minor issues concerning foreign relations such as
city partnership agreements. The Belgian constitution, which explicitly grants
subnational units the competence to conclude international agreements, if not to
conduct foreign affairs per se, clearly is an exception. In such a decentralized
system, every player has a veto and the component regions might challenge the
legal limits of federal power in foreign affairs, harming the latter’s international
image (Scharpf 1988).
In a federal context without such constitutional provisions, center–state
interactions on foreign policy issues are all about striking a balance between
national and subnational preferences. As suggested by the literature on party
politics and foreign policy outlined above, political parties play a crucial role in the
formation of such foreign policy preferences. Moreover, given the potentially
diverging interests between the national and the state levels, conflict between the
center and the states on foreign policy issues is always a possibility. Indeed, such
tensions and conflicts are at the heart of the early literature on sub-state diplomacy
(Duchacek 1984; Kincaid 1990; Michelmann and Soldatos 1990; Aldecoa and
Keating 1999). A variety of single case and small-n comparative works uncovered
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examples of both conflictive and cooperative relations. For instance, the
intensification in Mexican SNGs’ foreign relations throughout the 2000s is
described as “complementary” to the activities of the central government, “without
any visible conflict between the levels of government” (Schiavon 2018, 1665).
India, as will be seen below, is located more toward the other end of the spectrum,
with a substantial and increasing number of cases of inter-governmental conflict
over subnational states’ foreign relations.
Whereas consensus building (or conflict resolution) between the center and
states entails accommodation and concessions by all interacting parties (Kincaid
1990), the outcome of such processes eventually depends on a state government’s
ability to make its voice heard with the central government. When common
institutions or legal frameworks that guarantee participation of both levels of
government in foreign policy making are absent, individual states’ political
bargaining powers vis-a-vis the center determine the extent to which the latter can
pursue their own foreign relations. The more political weight regional parties or
regional affiliates of national parties have at the center, the more we may expect
subnational preferences to affect the center’s foreign policy. By contrast, an
exclusively national approach to foreign policy making is more likely under a one-
party-majority government than under coalition governments: in the latter, the
actions of the formateur (the leading party in the national coalition) are restrained
by a higher number of partisan veto players.
We therefore hypothesize that the essential explanatory variable is the political
relationship that a state government has with the central government, as this can
be expected to determine its bargaining power vis-a-vis the center on foreign policy
issues. States can be (a) affiliated, if they are governed by the same party as the
central government (or, more precisely for the Indian case, if the Chief Minister
shares the same political affiliation as the Prime Minister); (b) aligned, if they are
governed by a party that belongs to the governing coalition at the center (or, for
the Indian case, if the Chief Minister belongs to one of the coalition parties at the
center); (c) ruled by outside supporters’ parties, if they are governed by a party
that externally supports a minority government at the center; or (d) opposition
states, if they are ruled by a party that belongs to the opposition at the center.
While comparing states, we not only contrast opposition states with the rest,
i.e., “d” versus the rest, but also affiliated states with non-affiliated ones, i.e., “a”
versus the rest. The second type of comparison is required because under certain
circumstances, representatives of the largest party are found to discriminate even
against states where junior coalition members are in power (Rodden and
Wilkinson 2005).
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India’s Center^State Relations and SNG’s International
Engagements: Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we study 1153 episodes of international engagements of Indian
states over a span of twenty-one years. We coded the following activities as
subnational international engagement: (a) meetings between Chief Ministers and
representatives of foreign governments; (b) meetings between state government
representatives and foreign business leaders; (c) meetings between state government
representatives and regional high commissioners; (d) visits by state-level ministers
to other countries to attract investments or attend international summits; (e)
attempts by state governments to influence or oppose the national government’s
foreign policies or to pressurize the central government on international issue; (f)
interaction of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank with SNGs. We
selected all reported episodes mentioned during the sampling time frame of about
twenty-one years (May 1996–December 2017) in the English language national
newspapers/magazines The Times of India, The Indian Express, The Hindu, India
Today, and Business Standard (and the respective online archives) and further
scanned other regional, national, and international news media (see Online
Appendix for a complete list) as well as reports by the MEA to obtain rich data on
the subject. After the May 1996 elections, India entered into a phase of multi-party
coalitions while the process of economic liberalization gained momentum. It was
in mid 1990s that the international lending agencies such as the World Bank and
the Asian Development Bank shifted their focus to the subnational level. It is
around this period that the chief ministers began to go abroad more frequently
than ever before to market their respective states and woo investors. Thus, from
1996 onwards, the ‘interaction’ between liberalization of the Indian economy and
the pluralization of the Indian polity ensued.
Figure 1 shows period-wise episodes of SNGs’ international actions. Since the
beginning of the coalition era in 1996, such instances have increased across all
successive governments. Figure 2 confirms the same while demonstrating that the
phenomenon has become more entrenched since 2010. It also shows dips in
activity during election years, which simply means that Chief Ministers generally
avoid undertaking international engagements, being focused on elections at home.
In a clear vindication of this finding, Prime Minister Modi—in the run-up to the
2019 elections—advised the BJP Chief Ministers to focus on governance and avoid
foreign visits till elections are over (The Hindustan Times 2018). Furthermore, in
the months immediately following elections, the dip also implies that new
coalitions need to be formed in the first place in order to allow for foreign policy
activism of states.
It is only natural that with a rise of paradiplomatic activity also comes conflict.
Thus, we also coded the activities involving center–state conflict on foreign policy
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issues, either as the central government trying to block a particular state’s initiative,
or state government(s) trying to resist the central government’s policies. As
Figure 3 reveals, we find that the nature of conflict on foreign policy issues shows
contrasting patterns based on whether the central government is a coalition
without a party enjoying an absolute majority (the National Democratic Alliance,
NDA, and United Progressive Alliance, UPA, governments from 1999 until 2014)
or one characterized by a single-party majority (of the Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP,
in the NDA government formed in 2014). During the coalition era, subnational
governments dominated center–state interaction over issues related to international
engagements; since 2014, under the BJP majority government, the center has been
more influential, sometimes even blocking state governments’ attempts to enhance
their international exposure and engagement.
For purposes of regression analysis, we focus on the coalition era (1996–2013).
Our study is based on a sample of 14 major states of India, accounting for more
than 90 percent of all India population. The summary statistics have been reported
in table 1. During this period, we observe the international engagement of four











1996-1999 NDA (1999-04) UPA (2004-09) UPA (2009-14) NDA (2014-17)
Figure 1 Instances of subnational international action in India by government (1996–2017).
Note: During the term of the 11th Lok Sabha (22 May 1996–04 December 1997) India had three
prime ministers—A. B. Vajpayee (1996), H D Deve Gowda (1996–1997), and I. K. Gujral (1997–
1998). The Twelfth Lok Sabha (23 March 1998–26 April 1999) also yielded a weak coalition
government led by the BJP which turned out to be short-lived. From thirteenth Lok Sabha (20
October 1999–06 February 2004) onwards, India entered into a phase of stable coalitions.
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belonging to the coalition partner’s party CMalign, CMs belonging to the outside
supporters’ party CMosp, and CMs belonging to the opposition party CMopp.
We hypothesize that states that undertake international action without incurring
center–state conflict will be those in which the CM shares the party affiliation of
the PM. All other categories (coalition partners, outside supporters, and
opposition-party Chief Ministers), collectively termed as non-affiliated, would
have incentives to oppose the Prime Minister’s party’s preferred position on
foreign policy issues. At that point, the center can decide whether to acknowledge
states’ concerns or ignore them. Overall, the PM’s party will be willing to support
the states it rules far more than the non-affiliated ones. Moreover, the center is
more likely to take regional concerns seriously when a given Chief Minister’s party
is crucial to the stability and survival of the government at the center. Our
hypothesis has two testable predictions:
H1: Center–state cooperation on international engagement of a subnational
government is more likely when that government belongs to the Prime
Minister’s political party.
Figure 2 Instances of subnational international action in India on yearly basis (1996–2017).
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H2: Center–state conflict on international engagement of a subnational
government is more likely when that government belongs to a non-affiliated
party.
While modelling the impact of political variables on the extent and magnitude












NDA (1999-04) UPA (2004-09) UPA (2009-14) NDA (2014-17)
States resist centre's policy Centre blocks states' acon
Figure 3 Center–state antagonism over foreign policy issues (1999–2017).
Note: The “two national alliances” system comprising the NDA and the UPA began in 1999.
Table 1 Summary statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year 252 — — 1996 2013
Paradiplomatic
activity
Cooperation 252 2.900794 3.629516 0 34
Conflict 252 0.1269841 0.4460384 0 05
Population 252 69300000 40000000 18900000 210000000
NSDP (log) 252 28.04271 0.590452 26.73478 29.71744
Per capita NSDP (log) 252 10.13856 0.505315 8.855771 11.14327
Rural Population (log) 252 17.54035 0.605883 16.42881 18.88294
Election Year 252 0.353175 0.478908 0 1
CM (4 groups: Affiliated, aligned,
outside supporter, opposition)
252 2.572581 1.027346 1 4
CM Not affiliated (dummy) 252 0.757937 0.429185 0 1
CM Opposition (dummy) 252 0.496032 0.500979 0 1
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population, and election years. High-income states can be expected to be more
confident about engaging in international action (for example Gujarat and
Maharashtra in India), whereas there may be less public support for such action in
predominantly rural and agrarian states (for example Odisha and Bihar in India).
However, during election years, Chief Ministers generally focus on domestic
politics more than their international engagements.
Overall, the general functional form of the models can be presented as:
SNG
0
s international action it ¼ Ci þ b1Incomeit þ b2Ruralit þ b3Elect yrit
þ b4POL varit þ eit
Where SNG
0
s international action is the frequency of international engagement
of the ith state during the t-th year; Incomeit represents the income level; Ruralit
represents the predominantly rural economy or lack of urbanisation;
Elect yrit represents the election year; POl varit represents the political explanatory
variables (especially Chief Minister’s party affiliation) of the i-th state during the t-
th period of time; b1; b2; b3; and b4 are corresponding coefficients of the given
variables; Cirepresents the state-specific individual effects; and eit is the error term.
The results of multiple linear regression reported in table 2 reveal a statistically
significant probability of conflict when the Chief Minister belongs to an opposition
party (CMopp in Model 1b) or to any party except the PM’s (CMnot affil in Model 2b).
Model 3b confirms the hypothesis (H2) that when all three non-affiliated groups
are compared with reference to the affiliated group, confrontational activity of
opposition states is at both its highest magnitude and statistical significance. On
the other hand, conflict seldom sparks if Chief Ministers belong to the Prime
Minister’s political party.
Contrary to our prediction (H1) is the finding that belonging to a non-affiliated
political party did not have a significant negative effect on center–state
cooperation. The lack of statistically significant correlations obtained for CMopp
and CMnotaffil in the “a” group of models indicate that, under certain circumstances
there can be center–state cooperation even when the Chief Minister belongs to a
non-affiliated political party. However, the negative sign for CMopp (Model 1a)
indicate that cooperation on subnational governments’ international engagements
or foreign policy issues is less likely when there is an adversarial political
relationship between the center and a particular state.
Overall, the analysis shows that while the instances of cooperation might occur
irrespective of party affiliations, the episodes of center–state conflict occur more
significantly when the interacting governments at the two levels are controlled by
rival political parties. In such instances, different policy preferences of the center
and the state(s) cannot be resolved at the party level. Since quantitative analysis
cannot capture why and under what circumstances non-affiliated political parties
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will cooperate or oppose the central government over foreign policy issues, we
undertake multiple case studies of the dynamics of intergovernmental conflict and
cooperation in the next section.
India’s Center^State Relations and SNG’s International
Engagements: Qualitative Analysis
Our qualitative analysis focuses on four different dimensions of international
engagement: economic relations; security affairs and dispute resolution; the identity
dimension; and diaspora politics. We deliberately omit cultural diplomacy as
Table 2 Impact of Chief Minister’s affiliation on state government’s international action
Frequency of subnational
international action involving
cooperation or lack of conflict Incidence of center–state conflict













Per capita NSDP (log) 4.765** 4.721*** 4.868*** 0.313** 0.366** 0.349**
(3.00) (3.33) (3.57) (2.47) (2.91) (2.82)
Election Year 0.987*** 0.976*** 0.982*** 0.00 0.01 0.01
(5.23) (4.93) (4.93) (0.15) (0.15) (0.19)
Rural Population (log) 18.663* 18.723* 18.626* 0.24 0.24 0.25














Constant 281.678* 283.071* 279.867* 7.39 7.93 8.01
(1.97) (1.93) (1.94) (1.35) (1.42) (1.44)
R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.12 0.12 0.13
Dfres 13 13 13 13 13 13
Observations 252 252 252 252 252 252
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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relations between the center and the states in this field are far less conflictive than
in “high politics” fields.
Economic Relations
The bulk of international engagement of subnational governments across the world
lies in the realm of trade and investment (Requejo 2011; Sridharan 2003). In India,
there is enormous regional variation in states’ ability and willingness to engage in
economic diplomacy. A core finding from our qualitative analysis is that states
ruled by the Prime Minister’s party or by an outside supporter’s party get more
support from the center when lobbying for foreign investments. Particularly in the
field of economic paradiplomacy, Chief Ministers often directly compete amongst
themselves to attract FDI and win funding from international agencies. Politically
important states receive greater support and assistance by the central government.
One such case is Andhra Pradesh, which during the UPA II government was an
affiliated state (2009–2013) and was promptly granted environmental clearance to
set up a multipurpose irrigation project at Polavaram, regardless of environmental
and human rights concerns. In contrast, in Odisha, a mineral-rich state ruled by an
opposition party (Biju Janata Dal), the UPA II government stalled investments
from POSCO—a South Korean steel-making company and Vedant—a British-
based metal company, citing tribal rights and environmental concerns. Also, under
the NDA government after 2014, the requests by the Odisha government (still
controlled by the Biju Janata Dal) to expedite approvals remained unheeded,
forcing the companies to walk away from investment plans in 2017. The case of
Andhra Pradesh, which during the NDA government was an outside supporter
(1999–2004), also reveals that outside-supporter-ruled states have particular
advantages in extracting concessions from the center. During the NDA term in
office, Andhra Pradesh, ruled by the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), despite having
6.9 percent of India’s population, received 31 percent of all foreign aid flowing into
India in the fiscal years 2000–2001 and 2002–2003 (Kirk 2011, 105). When other
states became aware of the ad-hoc-ism involved, they pressed the center into
standardizing the procedure of foreign aid allocation. As a result, under the
Medium-Term Fiscal Reform Facility (MTFRF) scheme, state governments were
required to meet a set of fiscal commitments to be eligible for external assistance.
However, political favoritism still triumphed: even though Andhra Pradesh had
faltered on its MTFRF commitments, the central government allowed it to receive
$300 million in external assistance in 2003 to support the reform process.
Meanwhile, the center objected to a $200 million structural adjustment loan from
the World Bank for the opposition-party-ruled Karnataka, on the grounds that the
state had not met its MTFRF commitments (see Online Appendix).
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When it comes to center–state conflicts, our case studies also allow for some
interesting insights. We find that the center is more tolerant of affiliated states’
international engagement while all sorts of concerns are invoked to prevent
opposition states’ engagements. For example, our data shows that all instances of
the center denying a Chief Ministers’ foreign travels have been to opposition-ruled
states. Interestingly, such denials have been more extensive under majority
governments (nine episodes under the BJP-led government) than under coalition
governments (two episodes under UPA I and II combined). Moreover, during the
BJP-led government (2014–present), the center has invoked security concerns to
discourage international engagements of opposition-ruled states such as West
Bengal, Kerala, and Karnataka. In 2017, the Ministry of External Affairs did not
issue a clearance for West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s visit to China,
on the grounds that “the time [was] not right” (see Online Appendix). Similarly,
the center also denied permission to Kerala’s tourism minister and Karnataka’s
Minister for Large and Medium Industries to visit China. This contrasts with the
approach of the government towards affiliated/aligned states such as Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Andhra Pradesh, whose representatives were
actively encouraged to visit China and court Chinese investments during the same
period of tense relations with China (see Online Appendix for the dates and the
agenda of these CMs’ visits to China during 2015–17).
However, just as the central government hesitates to support opposition-ruled
states’ favorite projects, opposition-ruled states also oppose the national
government’s favorite investment projects. For instance, during UPA II (2009–
2014), opposition states opposed FDI in retail and nuclear power projects, while
affiliated states vowed to implement these policies. Policy changes in line with
changes of governments confirm that cooperation and conflict are a function of
party affiliation. For instance, during the UPA rule, Congress-ruled states such as
Haryana, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Assam, and Delhi welcomed
the policy decision to allow FDI in the retail sector. Non-Congress-ruled states,
such as West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Orissa, Gujarat, and
Kerala decided not to implement the decision. Only one non-Congress state out of
sixteen (Punjab) supported the decision and only two out of thirteen states ruled
by Congress or its allies (Himachal Pradesh and Kerala) opposed the policy.
Whereas all BJP-ruled states opposed FDI in retail when the UPA was in power at
the center, when the BJP formed the central government, all BJP-ruled states
supported the policy (see Online Appendix).
Finally, the qualitative analysis of international economic engagements revealed
an additional factor that can shape SNGs’ activism and sometimes contradicts our
general findings: the personal involvement of not just Chief Ministers, but also of
incumbent MPs (especially those with a ministerial berth at the center) who benefit
from investment projects located in their own constituencies and therefore get to
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play the role of “paradiplomats.” For example, in January 2012, External Affairs
Minister S.M. Krishna invited Sheikh Hamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan of the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) to discuss investment opportunities in his own home state,
Karnataka. At that time, the Chief Minister of Karnataka, D. V. Sadananda Gowda,
belonged to the opposition BJP, while Krishna represented the Congress party, the
Prime Minister’s party. The UAE delegation held discussions with officials
belonging to both parties and committed to invest in various infrastructure
development projects (see Online Appendix). Similarly, in October 2017, External
Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj lured foreign investors to invest in Madhya
Pradesh by promising them “special benefits” due to her constituency’s (Vidisha)
location within the state (Zee News 2016).
These qualitative findings help us make sense of the signs as well as absence of
significance for the center–state foreign policy cooperation. The negative sign for
CMopp in model 1a shows that the opposition states get less support from the
center and vice versa in comparison to the states ruled by the rest of the groups
(the PM’s party, the coalition partners and the outside supporters), leading to
fewer episodes of international activities involving cooperation or lack of conflict.
However, the lack of significance arises from the fact that there are instances when
the ruling party’s MPs or ministers seek FDIs in their own constituencies even if
they are located in opposition ruled or other non-affiliated states. Furthermore,
during the coalition era, the non-affiliated Chief Ministers were as active as their
affiliated counterparts in travelling overseas to attract investments. Thus, the
central government does not object to the investment scouting missions of non-
affiliated states per se (CMnotaffil ). Finally, the findings confirm that the positive but
non-significant coefficient for junior partners means that this group has been able
to extract support at times, based on its bargaining powers (TDP during 1999-
2004), but not always (CPI(M)during 2004-2009).
Security Affairs and Dispute Resolution
When it comes to security policy, the central government generally tends to refer
to the national interest in order to avoid interference by state governments.
However, states have some room of manoeuver to challenge the center’s activities.
The most salient case in which non-affiliated states nearly brought down the
central government over a foreign policy issue was India’s so-called “nuclear deal”
with the United States. When the UPA government initiated negotiations with
Washington that culminated in the 2008 Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement, Gujarat’s
BJP Chief Minister criticized the deal as an assault on India’s nuclear sovereignty,
and several state parties followed suit. The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) of India’s
most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, opposed the deal as “anti-Muslim” arguing
that it was being done “at the ‘cost of cheap gas’ from Iran” (Economic Times
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2008). The Telugu Desam Party of Andhra Pradesh rejected it as compromising
India’s sovereignty. However, the central government did not truly worry until
after the Left Front withdrew its support to the government criticizing the UPA for
succumbing to “American hegemony” (Outlook 2008).
Indian states also have had a significant bearing on the center’s approach to
bilateral treaties with several foreign countries. States have started asserting their
participation in those foreign affairs having a direct bearing on them, especially
since the mid-1990s (Basu 2016). Whereas some states routinely demand
consultation and engagement in the treaty making and dispute resolution process,
the center’s response depends on state parties’ political influence over the national
ruling party or coalition.
The most prominent incident of a state interfering in the center’s attempts of
resolving bilateral disputes through treaty-making concerns the case of India–
Bangladesh water sharing. In 1996, the United Front (coalition) government at the
center actively sought the West Bengal CM, Jyoti Basu’s support in finding a
permanent solution to the problem (Pandey 2012). In 1996, Basu undertook a five-
day visit to Bangladesh to resolve the dispute over water sharing of the river Ganga
that flows from India to Bangladesh. Hence, the center granted full authority to the
‘affiliated’ CM to lead Indo-Bangladesh talks on Ganga water sharing. This
approach was successful and led to the signing of the Ganga water agreement in
1996 (Pandey 2012).
By contrast, the center held only half-hearted discussions with an outside-
supporter party’s Chief Minister on the similarly pressing issue around the sharing
of water of the Teesta river between India and Bangladesh a decade later. When the
political status of West Bengal’s Chief Minister changed from affiliated (1996-98)
to outside-supporter during the UPA I rule at the center (2004–2009), the
government deputed then-Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee to simply discuss
the Teesta accord proposal prepared by the central government with West Bengal’s
then-Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharya (CPI-M). No further progress was
made between 2009 and 2011.
However, even under a coalition party’s Chief Minister, center–state cooper-
ation is not guaranteed, if the center is not willing to fully engage with the state.
For instance, with a coalition party’s Chief Minister in power in West Bengal, the
central government revised the Teesta water sharing accord without consulting the
CM, Mamata Banerjee (see Online Appendix). Since the agreement had allegedly
been changed without her consent, Banerjee decided not to accompany the PM on
that trip; the deal was aborted with Banerjee threatening to withdraw her party’s
participation in the national coalition. Since then a solution to the problem of
Teesta water sharing continues to elude both India and Bangladesh.
Another case that illustrates the role of the Indian states in the high-politics
areas is the Land Boundary Agreement between India and Bangladesh. The
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landmark India-Bangladesh accord—signed during Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh’s trip to Dhaka in 2011—was opposed by the Chief Minister of West Bangal,
Mamata Banerjee, whose party Trinamool Congress (TMC) was a coalition partner
of the UPA government. She claimed that the proposed demarcation of land
boundaries was done without consulting either local people or herself, as Chief
Minister. In 2013, when the central government made an attempt at passage of the
Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) Bill in the upper house, the TMC MPs stalled
the bill—having already broken ties with the UPA government in September 2012.
After 2014, with the BJP having comfortable majority in the lower house and
the Congress party already being in the favor of the LBA, it was clear to Banerjee
that the bill would be passed in the parliament without much difficulty. Thus,
instead of obstructing it, she focused on getting the maximum financial benefits
out of the deal: she negotiated a package of Rs. 3,008 crore ($423.4 million) from
the BJP government for infrastructure development and extended her support to
the bill, citing local support for the agreement as the key reason (see Online
Appendix).
These cases reveal the multiple forms that center–state interactions can take over
foreign policy issues. In the high-politics areas of security affairs and dispute
resolution, whether states’ sensitivities will undermine cooperation with the center
will be a function of political cost-benefit analyses on the part of the state
governments. State governments value their relationship with local voters as much
as they seek power as coalition partners, and sometimes they can get sandwiched
between pressures from below (local people) and from above (national
government). Which way the state government will go is a function of political
expediency. There are instances of both. Mamata Banerjee opposed the water
sharing agreement in 2011 despite being a coalition partner. At the same time, the
Land Boundary Agreement indicates the extent to which states’ positioning toward
international treaty-making depends on their political relationship towards the
center.
The Identity Dimension
Identity politics becomes a foreign policy issue for SNGs when they share ethnic
identities with certain groups in foreign countries. In such cases, if there are several
regionalist parties, they might end up competing amongst themselves to capitalize
on these issues.
The most salient of such cases is that of Tamil Nadu’s impact on India’s policies
vis-a-vis Sri Lanka. In Tamil Nadu, two regional parties—the AIADMK and the
DMK—routinely politicize the electorate’s regional Tamil identity in their
competition for power. Consequently, the fate of the Tamil minority in
neighboring Sri Lanka has been a major issue of political debate. However, even in
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this case the positions taken by regional parties and the central government’s policy
decisions are largely determined by center–state political relations.
Already in 1991, the AIADMK, which together with the Congress was an outside
supporter of the central government of Chandra Shekhar, managed to induce the
central government to dismiss Tamil Nadu’s DMK government and to impose
President’s rule on the state. The reason given was that the DMK state government
in Tamil Nadu was conniving with the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) to carry out clandestine activities (Ramakrishnan 2016). Similar allegations
and attempts by the AIADMK to dismiss a DMK state government between 1996
and 2001, by contrast, failed because the DMK was a coalition partner in successive
central governments (both the United Front in 1996–1998 and the NDA in 1999–
2004). The final years of the civil war in Sri Lanka confirm the patterns of center–
state cooperation. Starting from July 2006, the Sri Lankan government launched a
brutal military offensive against the LTTE, and ultimately defeated the rebels
militarily in 2009, amid massive human rights violations. Throughout these years,
the DMK was in power in Tamil Nadu (2006–2011) and a coalition partner in the
ruling UPA government. Despite being sympathetic to the LTTE’s cause, the DMK
did not seriously undermine New Delhi’s policy of quiet support of the Sri Lankan
government’s military offensive (Destradi 2012). In contrast, Jayaram Jayalalitha,
the AIADMK opposition leader, desperate for a comeback as Chief Minister,
vocally condemned Sri Lanka’s military operations (Ramakrishnan 2016).
After the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war, the issue of investigating the Sri Lankan
government’s war crimes came center stage. Both the AIADMK and the DMK
competed with one another in demonstrating concern for Sri Lankan Tamils. And
indeed, when the DMK was a coalition partner at the center, it managed to stop
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh from participating in a Commonwealth Heads of
Government Meeting in Colombo as a sign of condemnation of the Sri Lankan
government. Yet such concessions by the central government were not sufficient in
the DMK’s eyes, which ultimately pulled out of the UPA II coalition over the issue
of calling for an international investigation and condemning Sri Lanka’s crimes as
“genocide” in a UNHRC resolution. The DMK alleged that the central government
had instead worked to water down the US-backed resolution. In March 2014, freed
from the pressure of its former coalition partner, the government of India decided
to abstain from voting on the resolution (see Online Appendix).
The Diaspora Dimension
After independence, and as an extension of the principle of non-interference, New
Delhi adopted a policy of not encouraging Indian diaspora to engage either with
India as a whole or their Indian states of origin (Varadarajan 2010). However,
against the backdrop of economic liberalization and the rise of regional parties,
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Indian states with a large number of people living in other countries have begun
actively engaging the Indian diaspora abroad. Moreover, with the first BJP-led
government from 1998 onwards, the center has become more attentive to diaspora
politics (Jaffrelot and Therwath 2007, 293). Overall, in this domain center–state
conflict is rare. Yet, as PM Modi has intensified and formalized his relation with
the diaspora (addressing diaspora forums has become a quasi-mandatory element
in his travels abroad) the two levels may compete in addressing issues pertaining to
the diaspora—and their competition tends to follow the patterns identified for the
other issue areas.
Take the example of the state of Kerala—the largest exporter of manpower to
Gulf countries. In 2004, when the UPA government at the center was a multi-party
coalition supported from outside by leftist parties, the government of Kerala
suggested the creation of a Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, a request that was
heeded. The fact that the Prime Minister and the Chief Minister of Kerala shared
the same political party affiliation at that time played a key role in that success. By
2014, however, the BJP-majority government, the most attentive Indian
government to diaspora politics since independence (Raja and Chauhan 2015),
decided to merge the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs with the Ministry of
External Affairs. The Kerala government, now under opposition-party rule,
protested against that step (The Times of India 2016).
Also, in other, more specific instances of diaspora politics, the political
affiliation of central and state governments played a role. For example, in 2012,
Rajasthan Chief Minister Ashok Gehlot wrote to External Affairs Minister S. M.
Krishna seeking his intervention for the expeditious release of Indians arrested in
Kuwait for alleged visa violations. Both Gehlot and Krishna belonged to the same
political party, so the needful was done without any of the two resorting to
competing claims. However, when the matter regarding the release of Keralite
prisoners from Sharjah jails in the UAE arose in 2017, the Chief Minister of Kerala
did not seek any help from the center; rather, he himself invited Sharjah’s ruler,
Sultan bin Mohammed Al-Qasimi, for a visit to Kerala. The Minister of External
Affairs was involved only when the Sultan announced the release. The minister
immediately tweeted the news of the 149 prisoners released from Sharjah jails, but
did not mention the significant role played by the opposition party Chief Minister
of Kerala (See online appendix).
Conclusion
This systematic and comprehensive study of subnational governments’ interna-
tional engagements in India since the mid-1990s revealed that India’s states, like
subnational governments elsewhere, are undergoing a process of transformation
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and internationalization, as illustrated in the continuous increase in state’s foreign
engagements from 1995 to 2017.
Our quantitative analysis also exposed that party affiliation matters more in
foreign policy issues involving center–state spats than in issues on which there is
no clash of interests. Overall, on controversial issues, states ruled by parties
affiliated with the ruling party in New Delhi follow the center’s foreign policy
stance. These are in turn the states that receive relatively more support from the
center, for instance in matters of attracting foreign aid or investments. By contrast,
the non-affiliated states—opposition states in particular—tend to take adversarial
positions on controversial issues and receive less support from the center. The
qualitative assessment of states’ international engagements has broadly confirmed
the findings of the quantitative analysis and has helped us identify some of the
underlying mechanisms and add nuance to our findings.
These insights from the case of India contribute to advancing our general
understanding of subnational diplomacy in various ways. First, they show to what
extent paradiplomacy is deeply political. Often, paradiplomacy is characterized as a
pragmatic, hands-on approach to international engagements (e.g., Barber 2013), in
which states and cities pursue concrete economic goals such as attracting FDI—
largely detached from diplomatic intricacies, power games, and more generally
“high politics”. Our findings confirm this expectation to the extent that the largest
part of Indian paradiplomacy is economically motivated. Yet, our analysis also
revealed that in India’s vividly democratic federal polity, paradiplomacy is highly
politicized. States’ foreign engagements are determined almost as much as by the
contingent power configuration in their relationship with the center as by their
economic needs or paradiplomatic capabilities.
Second, and relatedly, our findings speak to inside-out approaches in foreign
policy analysis. The steady increase of paradiplomatic activities (figures 1 and 2)
even beyond the coalition era in Indian politics supports the view that in many
foreign policy fields domestic factors (coalition politics, the rise of regional parties,
etc.) dominate external ones (as outside-in approaches would have it). Yet, this is
not heralding a new era of “constituent diplomacy” where subnational states co-
formulate foreign policy on par with the center (Kincaid 1990). Instead, evidence
provided in this article suggests that paradiplomacy, while getting increasingly
important and even extremely relevant in some cases, remains circumscribed by
party political relations between the center and the states. As a consequence, in
large federations with vivid democratic contests both at the central and state levels,
paradiplomacy—its impact and extent—is highly contingent, set to change over
time and hard to predict.
Third, the findings from our qualitative analysis reveal that subnational identity
politics is a major force in paradiplomacy. Its impact can go so far as to capture a
nation state’s diplomatic relations—as in the case of Tamil Nadu’s political parties’
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competition over solidarity with the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka. Further research
on paradiplomacy should delve deeper into such identity component, asking under
what conditions identity matters most in shaping paradiplomacy and engaging
more closely with diaspora studies.
Finally, the Indian case draws our attention to the fact that the interests and
capabilities of subnational units as well as individual leadership play a role in
shaping the extent to which states engage in paradiplomacy. Only a few Indian
states like Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and
Tamil Nadu are particularly active. These insights open up a range of avenues for
further research, which include explaining different intensities in center–state
collaboration/conflict on paradiplomacy; more carefully differentiating among
subnational units; and systematically assessing to what extent political leadership
has a distinct impact on center–state interactions. A further dialogue between the
comparative federalism and the foreign policy analysis literatures will be helpful in
this regard. Overall, the Indian case shows the extent to which paradiplomacy
merges domestic and international politics, with domestic rationales typically
trumping international considerations both at the center and in subnational states.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary data are available at Publius: The Journal of Federalism online.
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1. Research shows considerable evidence for political and administrative centralization
since the 2014 general elections (Sharma and Swenden 2018).
2. Also, see Salomon (2012) for an account of the boom in paradiplomacy amongst PT-
governed states and municipalities in Brazil following the PT’s national electoral victory
in 2003.
3. Current debates on Western countries expand the traditional left-right cleavage to one
between green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) versus traditional/authoritarian/nationalist
(TAN) parties (Hooghe and Marks 2018).
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